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This paper analyzes job flows in a sample of 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade,
exploiting a harmonized firm-level dataset.  It shows that industry and firm size effects (and especially
firm size) account for a large fraction in the overall variability in job flows.  However, large residual
differences remain in the job flow patterns across countries.  To account for the latter, the paper explores
the role of differences in employment protection legislation across countries.  Using a difference-in-difference
approach that minimizes possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems, our findings show that
hiring and firing costs tend to curb job flows, particularly in those industries and firm size classes that
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Over the past decade, a growing body of evidence has accumulated suggesting that the
reallocation of factors of production - including labor - plays a major role in driving pro-
ductivity growth (see for example Olley and Pakes [1996], Griliches and Regev [1995], Foster
et al. [2001], Foster et al. [2002] and Bartelsman et al. [2004]). New rms enter the market
and create new jobs, while other unprotable rms exit the market contributing to job
destruction (see e.g. Sutton [1997], Pakes and Ericson [1998], Geroski [1995]). Incumbent
rms are in a continuous process of adaptation in response to the development of new prod-
ucts and processes, the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive forces
(Davis and Haltiwanger [1999]). Market conditions and institutional factors play a major
role in shaping the magnitude of job ows and their characteristics (Davis et al. [1996]).
For example, smaller businesses are inherently more dynamic, in part because they tend
to be young ventures and adjust through a learning-by-doing process (Dunne et al. [1988],
Dunne et al. [1989]). In addition, some industries have inherently higher job ows than
others in all countries, given the smaller size of their typical business and lower inherent
entry costs (for example, Foster et al. [2002] report that job ows in the United States
retail sector are 1.5 times higher than in the manufacturing sector).
Technological and market driven factors are coupled with a host of regulations in driv-
ing job ows. For example, regulations aecting start-up costs or bankruptcy procedures
are likely to aect rm turnover and the associated labor mobility. Likewise, employ-
ment protection legislation may stie labor reallocation by raising labor adjustment costs.
Assessing the role of regulations in aecting job ows, over and above that played by tech-
nological and market-driven factors, is of great importance. While labor reallocation is
indeed important to promote productivity growth, it is also painful for the aected work-
ers, who face signicant search and other adjustment costs (see for example Mortensen and
Pissarides [1999a], Mortensen and Pissarides [1999b] and Caballero and Hammour [2000b]).
Several models predict that labor regulations reduce gross job ows (e.g. Bertola [1992],
Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993], Koeniger and Prat [2007]), but the empirical evidence
is still inconclusive. While several empirical papers nd a negative eect of employment
protection legislation on worker turnover (Bentolila and Bertola [1990], Nickell and Layard
[1999]), the eects on job turnover are more nuanced (Bertola and Rogerson [1997], Boeri
[1999]). Countries with dierent types of labor regulations are observed to have fairly
similar gross job ows. The lack of a causal relationship between regulations and gross
job ows at the aggregate level may be due to dierent elements. Stringent labor regu-
lations may be associated with other regulatory and institutional factors that also aect
job ows. For example, Bertola and Rogerson [1997] argue that the greater compression
3of wages in Europe than in the U.S. can compensate the dierences in labor regulations
and so explain the similarity of the turnover rates. A more fundamental problem is that
cross-country analyses of job ows may be awed by severe omitted variable problems and
measurement errors, including dierences in the distribution of activity across industries
and size of rms, as well as dierent cut-o points in the enterprise surveys from which job
ow data are obtained. To try to tackle these problems, a few papers have recently assessed
the impact of changes in labor regulations on job ows in individual countries exploiting
reform episodes that were targeted at specic groups in the labor market (exploiting \nat-
ural experiments") and generally found a signicant negative eect of strict employment
protection on job ows as well as substitution eects (see Kugler [2007]).1
In this paper, we draw from a harmonized and integrated rm-level dataset including
16 developed, emerging and transition economies of Eastern Europe. With these data, we
explore in detail the industry and size dimensions of the job ows, and relate them to insti-
tutional dierences across countries. Two recent papers exploit job ows across industries
within countries to investigate the role of employment protection: Micco and Pages [2006]
and Messina and Vallanti [2006]. Messina and Vallanti [2006] focus on cyclical and secular
variation in job turnover. The paper that is closest to ours in terms of questions and ap-
proach is Micco and Pages [2006]. The latter paper exploits industry level gross job ows
data for manufacturing for 18 countries and uses a dierence-in-dierence specication close
to the specication we consider in this paper. Our analysis diers from this study along
a number of related key dimensions. First, we use a harmonized rm-level database that
covers all rms with at least one employee for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors. Second, we exploit country, industry and rm size variation in our analysis. Inter-
estingly, we nd that rm size is by far the most important factor accounting for variation
in the job ows across country, industry and rm size classes. This suggests that exploit-
ing data by rm size is important both to provide greater within country variation in job
ows for our empirical identication strategy but also that distortions to job ows across
countries may very well interact with the ow and rm size relationship. Finally, our data
allow distinguishing between job ows generated by the entry and exit of rms and those
generated by the reallocation of labor by incumbent rms. As shown in the paper, this
sheds additional light on labor reallocation and the role of regulations in labor and product
markets.
1Kugler [2007] summarizes a number of empirical studies that have looked at the eects of reform
episodes on job ows in Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the United States. These episodes provide
\natural experiments" that allow comparing groups of workers targeted by the reform to groups of workers
not directly aected by the reform before and after the policy change in what is otherwise the same
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. The main conclusion of these studies is that increasing the
strictness of employment protection legislation reduces job (and worker) ows, while the composition of
employment is also swayed against young and female workers.
4To give a preview of our results, we nd that countries share a number of features
of job ows along the industry and size dimensions. All countries are characterized by
large job ows. These vary signicantly and systematically across industries, pointing to
technological and market-driven factors, but they vary especially across rms of dierent
sizes. To provide perspective on the importance of rm size, we nd that industry eects
alone account for about 5 percent of the variation in job reallocation rates across industry,
size and country classes while rm size eects alone account for about 47 percent of the
same variation. However, even after controlling for industry and size eects, there remain
notable cross-country dierences in job ows. In this paper, we develop a formal test of
the role that hiring and ring regulations have in explaining these dierences, and also
test for the robustness of our results to the inclusion of other regulations aecting business
operations. We use a dierence-in-dierence approach whereby we identify an industry
and size class's baseline job reallocation from the United States data. The advantage,
compared with standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies, is that we exploit
within country dierences between industrysizes based on the interaction between country
and industrysize characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country and industrysize
eects, thereby minimizing the problems of omitted variable bias and other misspecica-
tions. Interestingly, we nd support for the general hypothesis that hiring and ring costs
reduce turnover, especially in those industries and size classes that require more frequent
labor adjustment. Moreover, stringent labor regulations have more of an impact on job
ows resulting from the entry and exit of rms than from reallocation among incumbents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our harmonized
rm-level dataset and discusses the dierent concepts we have used to characterize labor
reallocation. Section 3 analyzes the main features of job ows, highlighting the role of
rm dynamics, industry and size compositions. Section 4 introduces the dierence-in-
dierence approach used in the econometric analysis and discusses the empirical results for
the baseline and policy augmented specications of the job ow equations. It also describes
a battery of robustness tests. Finally, section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2 Data
Our analysis of job ows draws from a harmonized rm-level database that includes 16
industrial, emerging and transition economies (Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal,
the United Kingdom and the United States, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) and covers the 1990s (the time period covered varies
5by country - see Table A.1).2 The data collection was conducted by an active participation
of local experts in each of the countries, and involved the harmonization of key concepts
to the extent possible (such as entry and exit of rms, job creation and destruction, and
the unit of measurement), as well as the denition of common methods to compute the
indicators (see Bartelsman et al. [2007] for details).3
The key features of the micro-data underlying the analysis are as follows:
Unit of observation: Data used tend to conform to the following deni-
tion:\an organizational unit producing goods or services which benets from a
certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of
its current resources" (EUROSTAT [1998]). Generally, this will be above the
establishment level.
Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person businesses
(rms without employees), others omit rms smaller than a certain size, usu-
ally in terms of the number of employees (businesses without employees), but
sometimes in terms of other measures such as sales (as is the case in the data
for France). Data used in this study exclude single-person businesses. However,
because smaller rms tend to have more volatile rm dynamics, remaining dif-
ferences in the threshold across dierent country datasets should be taken into
account in the international comparison.
Industry coverage: Special eorts have been made to organize the data
along a common industry classication (ISIC Rev.3) that matches the OECD-
Structural database (STAN). In the panel datasets constructed to generate the
tabulations, rms were allocated to the single STAN industry that most closely
t their operations over the complete time-span.
The rm-level and job ows data come from business registers (Finland, the United
Kingdom and the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia), social security databases (Ger-
many, Italy, Mexico) or corporate tax rolls (Argentina, France, Hungary). Annual industry
surveys are generally not the best source for rm demographics, due to sampling and re-
porting issues, but have been used nonetheless for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Data for
Portugal are drawn from an employment-based register containing information on both
2The database also includes Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan (China) as well as Canada, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Romania and Venezuela, but annual data on job ows are not available for these countries
or are not fully reliable.
3Micco and Pages [2006] compiled a dataset from dierent country sources covering 2-digit manufactur-
ing sector information for 18 countries. Their dataset does not include transition countries, and does not
allow dierentiating job ows by rm status and rm size for all the countries.
6establishments and rms. All these databases allow rms and jobs to be tracked over time
because addition or removal of rms from the registers reects the actual entry and exit of
rms.
We dene four size classes based on the number of rm employees: 1- 19 workers,
20-49 workers, 50-99 workers, and 100 or more workers. The job reallocation rate (sum)
is dened as the sum of job creation and job destruction rates,4 and we allow those to








represents industry, s represents size class, c represents country, t represents time and E
denotes employment. Capital letters S and C refer to a set of size classes or countries,
respectively. The symbol  denotes the rst-dierence operator, Et = Et   Et 1.5
3 Basic Facts about Job Turnover in Industrial and
Emerging Economies of Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe
This section reviews the main stylized facts emerging from our analysis of job ows across
countries, industries and rm size.6 We review these stylized facts below to motivate our
multivariate analysis. A slightly longer list of the basic facts as well as their more detailed
description can be found in Haltiwanger et al. [2006].
1. Large Job Turnover in All Countries
The rst stylized fact emerging from the data is the large magnitude of gross job ows (the
sum of job creation and job destruction) in all countries, both at the level of total economy
and in manufacturing (see Haltiwanger et al. [2006]). Gross job ows range from about
25 percent of total employment on average in the OECD countries, to about 30 percent in
Latin America and the transition economies (see Table B.1 in the appendix). By contrast,
net employment changes were very modest if not nil in the OECD and the Latin America
samples, while the transition economies recorded a signicant net job growth in the period
covered by the data, after the substantial job losses of the early phases of the transition.
The high measured pace of reallocation in all countries may reect many factors.
Taken at face value, the patterns suggest a high degree of dynamism in virtually all
4We take averages of pos and neg, and then calculate sum.
5See also Davis et al. [1996].
6See Geroski [1995] for a summary of the main stylized facts characterizing rm demographics.
7economies. However, as discussed in the introduction, there may be many dierent country-
specic factors that inuence the overall pace of job reallocation. Accordingly, identication
of the impact of regulations requires exploiting more than simply cross-country variation.
2. Firm Turnover Plays a Major Role in Total Job Flows
The second stylized fact is the strong contribution of rm creation and destruction to job
ows. Entering and exiting rms account for about 30-40 percent of total job ows (see
Table B.1 in the appendix). In the transition countries, entry was even more important in
the early years of transition to a market economy, while the exit of obsolete rms became
more predominant in the second half of the 1990s, both for the total economy and in
manufacturing, when market contestability strengthened.7
3. Small Firms Contribute Disproportionately to Job Flows
Small rms account disproportionately for job ows and rm turnover in all countries of
our sample. Figure 1 presents job reallocation rates by rm size classes and countries. In
general, job reallocation is highest in rms with less than 20 employees, and the lowest in
rms with 100+ employees. In the United States, job turnover declines monotonically with
rm size, and the decline is particularly marked among large units (100+). Latin American
countries follow similar patterns to those of the United States, while the European countries,
with the exception of France, have a less marked drop of job reallocation among larger units.
The transition countries, on the other hand, show a steeper slope in smaller size classes,
especially in the early years of transition. Our data also suggest similar patterns for rm
turnover by size class and country (results not presented here). It is this variation of job
ows by size class as well as the variation across industries and countries that we exploit
in our empirical analysis.
The analysis of size specic job reallocation rates should be complemented with a
decomposition of the overall job reallocation into that due to rms of dierent sizes. We
nd small rms account for the largest share of rm turnover and also for a signicant,
albeit less dominant, share of total job ows. In terms of shares of job reallocation by size
class, we nd a U-shaped relationship that reects two osetting eects { rst, job ows
are higher for small rms as evidenced in Figure 1 and second, employment is concentrated
in larger rms.
4. Analysis of Variance
The next step is to assess the relative importance of the dierent dimensions { country,
industry and size { in explaining the overall variance in job ows. Table 1 presents the
7The large job ows in the transition countries are not surprising. The process of transition started in
the early 1990s and it included downsizing or exit of existing rms as well as the entry of new rms as the
economies progressed toward a market economy.
8Figure 1: Job Reallocation across Firms of Dierent Sizes, Total Economy
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
analysis of variance of job ows, for the unbalanced total economy sample.8 We consider
dierent indicators of job ows - gross job reallocation, excess job reallocation, job realloca-
tion from entry and exit and job reallocation for continuers. We also assess the contribution
to total variance of industry, size, country and industrysize eects separately, and, in ad-
dition, dierentiate the analysis of variance by region (OECD, transition economies and
Latin America).
It is noticeable that technological and market structure characteristics that are re-
ected in the industry-specic eects explain only 5.1 percent of the overall variation in
gross job reallocation across industry, size and country classes, although they account for a
higher share in Latin America (18.4 percent). By contrast, dierences in the size structure
of rms explain as much as 47 percent of the total variation in cross-country gross job
reallocation in all regions. Even country eects explain more of the variation in gross job
reallocation than the industry eects, except in Latin America. Hence, even though there
8The total economy sample is unbalanced in the sense that it covers manufacturing only for United
Kingdom, Brazil, Chile and Colombia - see Table A.1 for details.
9are similarities among countries within a region, there is still signicant variation across
them. Overall, the combined industrysize eects explain the bulk of the variation in
gross job reallocation: 52.2 percent overall, 46.7 percent in OECD countries, 64.3 percent
in Latin American countries and 55.8 percent in transition countries in the second half of
the 1990s.
Size heterogeneity plays a particularly strong role in explaining the variation of job
creation by new rms and job destruction by exiting rms. Size heterogeneity is particularly
important in Latin America, where it accounts for 80 percent of the heterogeneity in job
reallocation from entry and exit. In the OECD countries, size heterogeneity plays a smaller
role in both job reallocation from entering and exiting rms.9 It is also interesting that
size and industrysize eects account for a substantially larger fraction of entry and exit
variation than for continuers. Apparently, a key component that accounts for variation in
job reallocation across industrysize and size classes is dierences in the pace of entry and
exit. Put dierently, it suggests that the margin of adjustment that is used to accommodate
higher job ows is entry and exit and, as such, our working hypothesis is that it may be
this variation that is especially sensitive to distortions.
5. The Correlation of IndustrySize Job Flows Across Countries
It is also of importance to assess the correlation of industry job ows across countries. If
market-driven and technological factors were the only factor at play, we should observe a
strong correlation across countries. However, industry-level job ows in each country are
also inuenced by the institutional environment in which rms operate. Lack of correla-
tion may not therefore imply that market-driven and technological factors do not play a
signicant role, but rather that policy and institutions distort job ows. Job ows are
part-and-parcel of the creative destruction process, and an unfavorable institutional envi-
ronment will cause this process to stagnate (Caballero and Hammour [2000a]). To minimize
the possible interference of the policy environment, we present the rank correlation of in-
dustry job ows, which may provide a better proxy for the true correlation if the policy
environment aects levels but not the rank order of industrysize ows.
Industrysize-level correlations with the U.S. are particularly strong for some Latin
American countries, e.g. Brazil (0.90) and Colombia (0.92), despite the very dierent
9In unreported results, we have examined the analysis of variance separately for entry and exit. The
most interesting aspect of this latter exercise is the nding that in the transition economies there is a strong
dierence between the factors accounting for variation in job creation and destruction. The variation of
job creation by entrants is strongly inuenced by size heterogeneity, while the importance of size eects
for variation in job destruction by exiters is relatively small. The reason for the latter is that there are
osetting forces inuencing exit in the transition economies. As in most countries, many young businesses
fail in the early phases of their life, but in the transition economies (particularly in the early phases of their
economic transformation) structural changes also involved the exit of many large, state owned enterprises.
10Table 1: Analysis of Variance, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Reallocation Job Reallocation
Reallocation Reallocation - Entry&Exit - Continuers
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0511 0.0373 0.0074 0.0924
OECD 0.0730 0.0111 -0.0386 0.1660
LAC 0.1836 0.1120 0.0580 0.2585
Transition -0.0274 0.0200 -0.0386 -0.0008
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.4690 0.4576 0.5008 0.1924
OECD 0.4100 0.4430 0.4226 0.1750
LAC 0.4724 0.5043 0.7023 0.1169
Transition 0.5220 0.4894 0.4557 0.2966
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.1527 0.1311 0.1342 0.2172
OECD 0.1910 0.1775 0.2115 0.2015
LAC 0.1474 0.1158 0.0382 0.3640
Transition 0.0758 0.0842 0.1020 0.1232
INDUSTRYSIZE EFFECTS
All 0.5215 0.4898 0.5069 0.2805
OECD 0.4688 0.4251 0.3762 0.3157
LAC 0.6430 0.5993 0.7958 0.2737
Transition 0.5584 0.5319 0.4236 0.3328
Adjusted R-squared is reported. Late 1990s data are used for transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
degree of economic development, as well as for Great Britain (0.90) (Table 2).10 Some of
the lowest correlations are found for some EU countries, in particular France (0.54). It is
also interesting to see that transition economies had a much stronger correlation of their
job ow patterns by industry and size class with the United States in the sample that
covers the entire 1990s than in the sample used in this paper that focuses on the 1996-2001
period (see Haltiwanger et al. [2006]). This could be surprising, since the early phases of
the transition were characterized by massive job reallocation and the unique need to change
the structure of the economy. One working hypothesis that we develop later in the paper is
that after the initial phases of transition, these countries have moved toward the job ow
patterns observed in EU countries, with whom they share several policy and institutional
factors.
6. The U.S. vs. Other Countries in the \Slope" of the IndustrySize Re-
10Correlations are on average higher if we focus only on manufacturing, see Haltiwanger et al. [2006] for
more details.
11Table 2: Rank Correlations with the U.S. Job Flows, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Reallocation Job Reallocation
Reallocation Reallocation - Entry&Exit - Continuers
OECD 0.7515 0.7044 0.7223 0.6254
Germany 0.8468 0.8634 0.9191 0.7214
Finland 0.6946 0.5837 0.3532 0.7742
France 0.5418 0.4670 0.7385 0.1762
United Kingdom 0.8994 0.8330 0.8229 0.6565
Italy 0.6901 0.6835 0.6896 0.6628
Portugal 0.8363 0.7957 0.8106 0.7611
LAC 0.8528 0.8124 0.8542 0.5622
Argentina 0.8844 0.8491 0.8421 0.7316
Brazil 0.8987 0.8526 0.9095 0.8135
Chile 0.6787 0.5444 0.7543 -0.1212
Colombia 0.9170 0.9054 0.8975 0.6062
Mexico 0.8853 0.9104 0.8676 0.7807
TRANSITION 0.7556 0.7546 0.6905 0.5903
Estonia 0.7364 0.6932 0.6236 0.6338
Hungary 0.8321 0.8157 0.8560 0.6897
Latvia 0.7005 0.7392 0.7215 0.4204
Slovenia 0.7534 0.7702 0.5609 0.6171
Late 1990s data are used for transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
allocation Relationship
The ndings from the previous two sub-sections suggest that industrysize eects account
for a large fraction of the variation in job ows across industry, size and country classes,
and also strong correlations between the rank order of job ows by industry and size in any
given country with that in the United States. These ndings help motivate our empirical
analysis of regulations below since they clearly indicate that there are common factors un-
derlining the patterns of job ows across countries and across industry and size classes. As
discussed above, these patterns plausibly reect technology, demand and cost fundamentals
(including the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and the costs of reallocation) that vary
across industry and size classes. Before going to a more formal empirical analysis of the
eects of policy-induced distortions on job ows, we run a simple descriptive regression in
which we quantify how the \slope" of the industrysize relationship varies between the
U.S. and the rest of the world. We take the U.S. as our benchmark because it is the coun-
try with arguably relatively low policy-induced distortions. In particular, we estimate the
12following regression:
JFlowsic = 0 + 1USJFlowsi +
C X
c=1
cDc + sic (1)
where Dc are country c (c = 1;:::;C) dummies, USJFlowsi is the U.S. job ow variable
in size class s and industry i, and  is the iid error term. This specication enables us to
quantify the relationship or slope between cross-industrysize dierences in gross job ows
between the United States and other countries in our sample. In this descriptive analysis,
we start with a baseline specication in which we only include the U.S. job ow benchmark
and the country dummies (equation (1)). We then allow the coecient of the U.S. job ow
variable to vary by region and by rm size class.11
As expected, the estimated coecient on the U.S. job ow in column (1) in Table 3
is highly signicant, conrming the bivariate correlation analysis discussed above. How-
ever, the estimated coecient is signicantly less than one, suggesting that, other things
being equal, the responsiveness to market and technologically driven factors that aect
reallocation in the U.S. is less than one in the other countries. Indeed, taking the U.S.
job ow rate as the benchmark for the propensity for the industrysize class to exhibit
reallocation from technology and market fundamentals, this nding suggests that when,
for example, the propensity increases from one industrysize class to another in a fashion
that induces a ten percent increase in job reallocation in the U.S., we observe only a 6.6
percentage point increase in job reallocation from the same industrysize class to the other
in other countries in the sample. In a suggestive sense, the coecient being less than one
is consistent with the view that countries around the world have factors that distort the
reallocation process.12
If we then allow the coecient on U.S. job ows to vary by region (EU, transition
countries and Latin America) (column (2)), we notice that there is a closer link between
cross-industrysize dierences in gross job ows between the United States and the Latin
American countries than between the United States and the European Union countries.
However, the coecients are signicantly less than one in all regions. Moreover, the coef-
cients on U.S. job ow for the European Union countries and for transition countries are
not signicantly dierent from each other at 1 per cent signicance level (but they are dif-
11The measure of job ows is the sum of job creation and job destruction rates (sum) and all variables
are time averages over the available annual observations (see the next section for more details).
12Appropriate caution needs to be used in interpreting the magnitude of the coecient since measurement
error can drive the coecient below one. Still, we nd it interesting that this coecient is, in general,
less than one, and that the pattern of variation in the magnitude of this coecient across regions and size
classes is consistent with our interpretation.










USA SUM<20 Workers 0.5385***
[0.0252]
USA SUM20-49 Workers 0.3875***
[0.0350]
USA SUM50-99 Workers 0.3169***
[0.0393]
USA SUM100+ Workers 0.2090***
[0.0649]
Country eects YES YES YES
Observations 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.73
All regressions include an intercept. Robust standard errors in brack-
ets. = signicant at 10%, = signicant at 5%, = signicant at
1%. USA SUM: industrysize job reallocation in the United States.
EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries
in Latin America.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
ferent at 5 per cent signicance level). The Wald test for the equality of the coecients on
U.S. job ow for transition countries and for Latin American countries cannot be rejected
at any of the usual signicance levels.
Next, we allow the coecient on U.S. job ows to vary by rm size (column (3))
and we nd - perhaps not surprisingly - that the coecient is the highest for the smallest
size class (1-19 employees) and declines monotonically for the larger size classes. In other
words, the patterns of cross industry job ows in the United States and other countries are
more similar among small rms than among larger rms, possibly because small rms are
exempt from certain regulations and/or can more easily avoid other regulations. Hence,
small rms show a degree of dynamism that is closer to that of the non-distorted (U.S.)
14economy. For larger rms, regulations are likely to be more binding, especially in those
industries that are inherently more volatile. The equality of all pairs of coecients can
be rejected at 1 per cent signicance level; the highest values of Wald test are obtained in
pairs with the coecient for the smallest size class, indicating that the coecient for the
smallest size class is highly signicantly dierent from those of larger size classes.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Framework
In this section, we develop an empirical analysis of the determinants of the observed dif-
ferences in job ows across countries, industries and size classes. We base our empirical
analysis on three important results discussed in the previous section: 1) a signicant share
of the total variance in job ows observed in the data is explained by industrysize ef-
fects, 2) there is a high correlation of industrysize job ows across countries, and 3) other
countries tend to have less variation across industrysize classes in the magnitude of re-
allocation than the U.S. The rst two results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
distribution of idiosyncratic prot shocks aecting desired employment and the costs that
inuence the adjustment to such shocks varies systematically by industry and size class.
For example, demand characteristics in some industries imply that rms face higher volatil-
ity in their product demand than other industries. Likewise, technological characteristics
may require more frequent re-tooling of the production process with the associated need to
adjust the workforce. Alternatively, certain technological characteristics may require rms
to use highly specialized workers and thus make them less likely to frequently adjust their
workforce to respond to idiosyncratic shocks. Demand and technological characteristics
also aect the composition of rms within each industry and their response to shocks. For
example, some industries are characterized by the presence of small rms which tend to be
more volatile than large businesses in all countries. As discussed in the prior section, the
third result is suggestive that there are factors that impede reallocation dierences across
industrysize classes in other countries relative to the U.S. Our empirical analysis in this
section is designed to identify and quantify such factors. Before proceeding to that empiri-
cal analysis, it is instructive to review the insights from the recent literature on adjustment
costs and reallocation (see, e.g., Caballero et al. [1997]).
Adjustment costs governing responses to idiosyncratic shocks vary not only by indus-
try and size, due to underlying market and technological factors, but also across countries,
due to dierences in institutions and policy settings. To the extent that institutions vary
15Figure 2: Distribution of productivity shocks and xed adjustment costs - two-sector case
more by country than industry and size, our working hypothesis is that the impact of insti-
tutions that hinder adjustment in any given country will be more binding on industrysize
16cells with the greatest propensity for reallocation in that country. The amount of job re-
allocation in a particular sector hence depends on the distribution of productivity shocks
(z) and adjustment costs.
A simple (S;s) model with xed costs of adjustment can be used to illustrate the
logic behind our argument. First, consider two sectors, 1 and 2, where sector 2 has a higher
variance of productivity shocks and both sectors have the same thresholds of adjustment,
z1 = z2 and z
1 = z
2, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2 where f1 (z) and f2 (z)
represent the probability density function of productivity shocks. The sector with a higher
variance of productivity shocks has a larger fraction of rms in the tails - the range of
activity where the rms adjust to the new conditions - and in an associated manner more
mass of the distribution at the adjustment thresholds. Hence, as our working hypothesis
suggests, more volatile sectors are more sensitive to regulations or institutional factors that
raise adjustment costs for rms, since they have a higher fraction of rms in the range of
activity impacted by such adjustment costs.
Second, Panel B of Figure 2 considers the case of two sectors with the same variance
of productivity shocks; however sector 2 has higher adjustment costs and hence a wider
range of inactivity (which is illustrated by z2 < z1 and z
2 > z
1). If adjustment costs
in a country increase for both sectors because of more stringent regulations - for example,
stricter employment protection legislation - the thresholds will be pushed to z1 < z1,
z
1 < z
1, z2 < z2 and z
1 < z
1. Sectors with originally lower adjustment costs will be
more adversely aected, since increase in adjustment costs will push a higher fraction of
rms from the range of adjustment (reallocation) to the range of inactivity (no reallocation).
This simple (S;s) model illustrates the basic argument for incumbent rms, but it
is straightforward to extend its argument to include the entry and exit of rms. Indeed,
standard models of entry and exit (e.g., Jovanovic [1982], Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993],
Melitz [2003], Asplund and Nocke [2006]) posit that new entrant rms do not know, ex
ante, their productivity type and must pay an entry fee before learning their type. Firms
enter the market until the expected present discounted value of prots from entry is just
equal to the entry cost. Firms with low productivity draws exit ex post. Higher adjustment
costs { including labor adjustment costs { reduce the present discounted value of ex ante
prots, especially for sectors with a high variance of productivity shocks (for the reasons
discussed above). This yields a lower pace of entry as well as an implied lower pace of exit
in the steady state. The model that illustrates this eect most directly is Hopenhayn and
Rogerson [1993] who show that higher employment adjustment costs lead to a lower pace
of job and rm turnover.
174.2 The Estimation Model
We explore the links between the regulatory environment in which rms operate and
job turnover by exploiting the observed industrysize variations through a dierence-in-
dierence approach (see Rajan and Zingales [1998]).13 The test is constructed as follows: we
identify an industrysize propensity for job reallocation from the United States data. Un-
der the assumption that regulations in the labor and goods markets in the United States are
among the least restrictive in our sample, variation in job reallocation across industrysize
cells in the United States should proxy for the technological and market driven dierences
in job reallocation in the absence of policy induced adjustment costs. Under the additional
assumption that these technological and market driven dierences in the demand for job
reallocation carry over to other countries, we assess whether industrysize cells that have
a greater propensity for job reallocation are disproportionally aected by regulations that
raise adjustment costs. This would imply that, ceteris paribus, industrysize cells with
more volatile idiosyncratic prot shocks and more frequent adjustment of factors should
be more strongly aected by regulations raising adjustment costs than those industrysize
cells with less volatile idiosyncratic prot shocks and less frequent adjustment. The advan-
tage of our approach compared to standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies
is that we exploit within country dierences between industrysize cells based on the in-
teraction between country and industrysize characteristics. Thus, we can also control for
country and industrysize eects, thereby minimizing problems of omitted variable bias
and other misspecications.
The core model specications used in our empirical analysis can be summarized as
follows:






cDc + 2 (USJFlowsi  Rc) + sic (2)
where Dsi are industrysize si (si = 1;:::;I  S) dummies, Dc are country c (c = 1;:::;C)
dummies, USJFlowsi is the U.S. job ow variable in size class s and industry i, and  is
the iid error term. Controlling for country eects sweeps out any country-specic variation,
controlling for industrysize eects sweeps out the large common factors associated with
industry and size, and the key interaction term between the U.S. ow in the industrysize
class and the country regulation allows us to identify how the measured regulatory en-
vironment aects the variation across industrysize classes within countries. The U.S.
13The dierence-in-dierence approach has already been used in the corporate literature (e.g., Classens
and Laeven [2003]), in the analysis of rm dynamics (Klapper et al. [2006]) and in the analysis of output
and employment growth as well as job ows (Micco and Pages [2006]).
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ow here is used to quantify the propensity for the industrysize class to reallocate and,
as discussed, reects the fundamental driving forces underlying job reallocation across
industrysize classes.
In what follows, the measure of job ows used in the empirical analysis is the sum
of job creation and job destruction rates (sum). The results are largely unaected by the
use of excess job reallocation, that is, the dierence between the sum and the (absolute
value of) net employment change. All our variables are time averages over the available
annual observations. The sample is unbalanced and covers fewer years for some countries
than others (see Table A.1). Time averaging allows us to reduce the possible impact of
business cycle uctuations in the years for which we have the data and the possibility that
such uctuations were not synchronized (and thus could be captured by common time
dummies). We use the period from 1989 to 2001 for OECD and Latin American countries
and sample from 1996 to 2001 for the transition economies. The choice of the restricted
sub-sample for the transition economies is motivated by two interrelated factors. First
and as discussed in the previous section, the initial years of the transition process (1991
to 1995) were characterized by unprecedented reallocation of labor - and other factors of
production - across industries, rms and locations. The magnitude and direction of the
observed ows were only temporary and, indeed, job ows declined towards the standards of
the OECD countries over time, and also became more balanced within each industrysize
cell.14 Second, the early years of transition were characterized by major regulatory reforms
to conform countries' institutional settings to those of market economies. For these two
reasons, focusing on the second half of the 1990s for the transition economies is more
appropriate in our comparative analysis of job ows.15
In addition to the core specication, we consider some closely related specications.
As a robustness check, we estimate an augmented model that also considers business sector
regulations. In addition, we explore specications that focus on, alternatively, job ows
from entry and exit or continuing rms.
4.3 Regulations in Labor and Product Markets
In the empirical analysis, we consider synthetic indicators of the stringency of regulations in
the labor and product markets, as well as the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations.
Our primary source for these is the \Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)" database
(see Gwartney and Lawson [2004]). This database has been developed under the auspices
14Results for the whole sample for transition economies are available in Haltiwanger et al. [2006].
15Dataset used in the paper is available at http://www.helenasch.net.
19of the Fraser Institute in Canada with the aid of a worldwide network of economists and
research institutes. In particular, we use indicators referring to hiring and ring practices,
regulation of business activities and integrity of the legal system.
Other indicators of the stringency of labor regulations in developing and emerging
economies are available in the literature (e.g., the World Bank Doing Business database),
but they generally refer to the most recent past and may thus not properly capture the
regulatory environment over the period covered by our data (the 1990s). By contrast, the
EFW tracks changes in regulations over time and is thus more suitable for our analysis of
job ows that have indeed been inuenced by policy changes over the period covered by
our data (see Table C.1 for more detailed denitions of the variables used in our analysis
and Table C.2 for their summary statistics).
The EFW indicator of hiring and ring restrictions is measured on a scale of 0 to 10,
with 10 being the worst (most restrictive). The average of this indicator is the highest in
transition countries (5.70), followed by the OECD sample (5.43) and Latin America (4.68).
This synthetic indicator passes simple validation tests. For example, its correlation with
a similar indicator of employment protection legislation developed by the OECD is 0.85,
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.16
In the sensitivity analysis, we also consider an EFW synthetic indicator of regula-
tions in the product market. Regulations aecting markets for goods and services have a
strong impact on the degree of competition and the pace and eectiveness of reallocation
of resources, including labor. Thus, more restrictive regulations that stie product market
competition are also likely to inuence job ows. The business regulation indicator is a
simple average of ve dierent indicators17 that are designed to identify the extent to which
regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures limit competition and the operation of
goods and services markets. Business regulation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with
10 being the most restrictive. This indicator is on average the highest in Latin America
(4.21), followed by transition countries (3.32) and OECD countries (3.07).
16We check the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure of employment protection
legislation, the OECD EPL index. Since this measure is not available for Latin America and transition
countries in the early 1990s, we augmented it in two ways. First, for transition countries we used data on
EPL collected by Haltiwanger et al. [2003]. Second, for Latin America we imputed EPL by regressing a
measure of hiring and ring practices from the Fraser Institute on EPL for transition and OECD countries
and then using the estimated coecient to calculate EPL. EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, with
4 being the worst (most restrictive). It is on average the strictest in OECD (2.35) and the least strict in
Latin America (1.73).
17The detailed indicators used to construct the synthetic indicator are: price controls, administrative
conditions and new business, time with government bureaucracy, starting a new business, and irregular
payments.
20Previous research (see, e.g., Caballero et al. [2004], Heckman and Pages [2004]) sug-
gests that the degree of enforcement of labor regulations - as well as other regulations - can
signicantly aect their impact on the economy. Available indicators suggest a signicant
variation in the rules of law and the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations in our
sample of OECD, Latin American and transition economies. Not only are some rms and
jobs not registered in Latin America and increasingly in the transition economies and some
Southern European countries, registered rms may also not fully comply with the existing
rules and regulations. As an indication of the dierent degree of enforcement of laws and
regulations, we consider the law and order indicator from the Fraser Institute (based on the
Political Risk Component I (Law and Order) from the International Country Risk Guide,
ranging from 0 to 10, 10 being the worst).18 The indicator shows the highest compliance
with laws and regulations in the OECD sample of countries (average of 0.47), followed with
the transition economies (average of 1.76), and by the Latin American countries (average
of 4.95).
To control for possibly diering degrees of enforcement of laws and regulations we








4.4 Regulations and Job Flows
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results of the estimation of our core specication
(2) and various extensions. Recall that in (2) we specify a dierence-in-dierence analysis
that identies the impact of regulations via the interaction eect of U.S. job ows in the
industrysize class with the country-specic regulation. The estimated coecient on the
interaction between the U.S. job ow and the adjusted labor regulation (Table 4) is strongly
signicant overall, and in each of the sub-regions when we allow the coecient of the inter-
action to vary. Consistent with the working hypothesis, more volatile industries and size
classes are impacted more in countries with more stringent hiring and ring regulations.20
18Micco and Pages [2006] also make an attempt at controlling for dierent degrees of enforcement of
regulations by using an indicator of rules of laws and government eectiveness (see Kaufmann et al. [2004]).
We used the Fraser index of law and order because it is available for the time period for which our job
ows data are available for the dierent countries.
19There is no indication in Gwartney and Lawson [2004] that the original regulatory variables consider
the enforcement of regulations in addition to the statutes.
20In our longer working paper version (see Haltiwanger et al. [2006]), we have also considered a related
specication where instead of controlling for industysize eects we have included the U.S. industrysize
ow separately to control for industrysize eects. In this alternative specication, we also include country
21Table 4: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Dierence-in-Dierence Analysis)
(1) (2)
USA SUMEPL (Adj) -0.0450***
[0.0082]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)EU -0.0478***
[0.0080]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)Transition -0.0370***
[0.0103]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)LAC -0.0449***
[0.0128]
Country eects YES YES
Industrysize eects YES YES
Observations 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.77
All regressions include an intercept. Robust standard errors in
brackets. = signicant at 10%, = signicant at 5%, =
signicant at 1%. USA SUM: industrysize job reallocation in
the United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries.
Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL (Adj) is an
indicator of stringency of hiring and ring regulations adjusted
to take into account dierent degrees of enforcement of regula-
tions (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
How sizable is the estimated impact of labor regulation on job ows? Using the
coecient on the interaction term in column (1) of Table 4, we estimate that the dierence
in job reallocation between industrysize cells with a high exibility requirement (90th
percentile of the exibility distribution in the United States) and industrysize cells with
a low exibility requirement (10th percentile of the same distribution) will be 4.4 percentage
points lower in a country with the highest index of hiring and ring regulations compared
to the United States, the country with the least restrictive regulations. Considering that
the average job reallocation rate is around 25 percent in the sample used in the regression,
eects. This alternative specication is more parsimonious since far fewer degrees of freedom are used
to control for industrysize eects. Interestingly, we nd virtually identical results for this alternative
specication and for purposes of brevity do not report those results here. It is also interesting that
the estimated coecient of the U.S. job ow benchmark is closer to unity than when we do not control
for enforcement (see Table 3). This nding suggests that part of the less than perfect correlation in the
magnitude of job ows in the countries in the sample with the United States can be explained by restrictive
labor regulations that raise labor adjustment costs.
22Table 5: Job Flows and the Role of Labor and Product Market Regulations (Dierence-
in-Dierence Analysis)
(1) (2)
USA SUMEPL (Adj) -0.0505***
[0.0104]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)EU -0.0397***
[0.0109]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)Transition -0.0789***
[0.0170]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)LAC -0.0647*
[0.0363]
USA FIRM TURNOVERBus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0277
[0.0290]
USA FIRM TURNOVERBus. Reg. (Adj)EU -0.0021
[0.0311]
USA FIRM TURNOVERBus. Reg. (Adj)Transition 0.1962***
[0.0600]
USA FIRM TURNOVERBus. Reg. (Adj)LAC 0.0832
[0.0900]
Country eects YES YES
Industrysize eects YES YES
Observations 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.78
All regressions include an intercept. Robust standard errors in brackets. =
signicant at 10%, = signicant at 5%, = signicant at 1%. USA SUM:
industrysize job reallocation in the United States. EU denotes the OECD Eu-
ropean countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL (Adj) is an indicator of
stringency of hiring and ring regulations adjusted to take into account dierent
degrees of enforcement of regulations. Bus. Reg. (Adj) is an indicator of strin-
gency of business regulations adjusted to take into account dierent degrees of
enforcement of regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
the estimated impact is indeed sizeable.21
21The estimated value is obtained as follows:
 [(USJFlow90th   USJFlow10th)(HFmax   HFmin)]
where  is the estimated coecient, and USJFlow and HF are the job reallocation in the United States
and the indicator of hiring and ring regulations corrected for the degree of enforcement, respectively.
Micco and Pages [2006], using a similar approach, estimated an impact of 5.7 percentage points. Their
23There are a number of reasons why it is important to assess the robustness of our
results on labor regulations to the inclusion of regulations in product markets. First,
the exclusion of product market regulations may lead to an omitted variable bias insofar
as regulations in dierent markets tend to be highly correlated, i.e. countries that impose
strict rules of hiring and ring also tend to impose more restrictive regulations on the goods
and services markets.22 There are also specic aspects of product market regulations that
can inuence job ows over and above labor regulations. For example, since a signicant
fraction of overall job ows is due to the entry and exit of rms, regulations aecting the
start up of a new business, as well as bankruptcy rules that aect the exit of low performing
units, may aect job ows directly and the way incumbents react to strict labor regulations.
Koeniger and Prat [2007], for example, argue that product and labor market regulations
are complementary: by isolating incumbents from the competition of potential entrants,
barriers to entry allow incumbents to bear the ring costs more easily. Likewise, regulations
aecting price setting by rms and their relations with the public administration and their
clients can all inuence incentives for rms to expand, adopt new technologies and adjust
their workforce.
To assess the robustness of our empirical results we thus augment our job ows
specication by adding a synthetic indicator of the stringency of business sector regulations.
As for labor regulations, we adjust this variable for the degree of enforcement (Table 5) and
interact it with the US employment-weighted rm turnover. We use rm turnover rather
than job ows here in the interaction term since business regulations primarily impact
the entry and exit of rms. Thus, the more relevant propensity for reallocation is the
reallocation component from rm turnover.23 The estimated eects of labor regulations
on job ows remain strongly signicant overall and in the dierent regions. By contrast,
the estimated coecient of business regulations is estimated with a large standard error
overall. When we dierentiate the coecient by region, we nd that the estimated eect
of business regulations is positive and signicant for transition economies. As we have
discussed above, the transition economies exhibited unusual patterns of entry and exit by
size class over at least some of the 1990s as large state owned rms exited which may be
relevant for this pattern.24
country sample and period of observation are dierent from ours but the results are close.
22There is also ample evidence that regulations in product and labor market tend to be correlated across
countries (see e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta [2005]).
23We have also used US job ows rather than rm turnover as the industrysize interacting factor:
the results are largely similar to those reported in the paper and are available on request. We nd some
sensitivity in the specications that also interact with region but the robustness of the labor regulations
holds in this alternative.
24Indeed there are models that yield a positive relationship between business regulations impacting entry
and exit and job turnover. For example, Koeniger and Prat [2007] have a model with both intensive and
extensive (i.e. through rm entry and exit) margins of adjustment, and xed and/or start-up costs imposed
24So far we have focused on the eects of labor regulations on overall job reallocation.
It is also interesting to shed light on whether such regulations have a dierent impact on
the dierent margins of reallocation, namely on job ows due to the entry and exit of rms
in the market and those due to reallocation among incumbents (see Table 6).25
Table 6: Job Flows by Entering, Exiting and Continuing Firms - the Role of Labor Market
Regulations (Dierence-in-Dierence Analysis)
Entry & Exit Continuers
(1) (2)
USA SUM (Entry&Exit)EPL (Adj) -0.1073***
[0.0102]
USA SUM (Continuers)EPL (Adj) 0.0154
[0.0137]
Country eects YES YES
Industrysize eects YES YES
Observations 946 934
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.62
All regressions include an intercept. Robust standard errors in brack-
ets. = signicant at 10%, = signicant at 5%, = signicant at 1%.
USA SUM (Entry&Exit): industrysize job reallocation due to enter-
ing and exiting rms in the United States. USA SUM (Continuers):
industrysize job reallocation due to continuing rms in the United
States. EPL (Adj) is an indicator of stringency of hiring and ring regu-
lations adjusted to take into account dierent degrees of enforcement of
regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the results of estimating the job ow regressions for
entering and exiting rms, controlling for labor market regulations corrected by the degree
of enforcement. Column (2) does the same for continuing rms. The results suggest a
negative and statistically signicant eect of labor market regulation (interacted with U.S.
job reallocation) on labor mobility generated by entering and exiting rms. By contrast,
the eect of labor regulations on continuing rms is not statistically signicant.26
by product market regulations. They nd that product market regulations lead to higher job turnover, as
the competition for workers is alleviated by the rm selection eect, the costs of adjusting the labor force
decrease and thus rms have less incentive to smooth out their labor demand schedule.
25We focus on the combined ows due to entry and exit of rms because of the very high correlations
between entry and exit across industries in most countries. This in turn suggests that entries and exits are
largely part of a creative destruction process in which entry and exit reect within industry reallocation
reecting idiosyncratic dierences across rms within industries (see Bartelsman et al. [2004] for evidence
based on the same dataset used in this paper, as well as Geroski [1991], Baldwin and Gorecki [1991]).
26In Table 6, we use the U.S. job reallocation for entry and exit as the propensity for entering and exiting
25That it is the entry and exit component of job turnover rather than the continuer
component of job turnover that is impacted by labor market regulations is an interesting
result that is somewhat surprising from a theoretical perspective but perhaps not surpris-
ing given the ndings from our analysis of variance. From a theoretical perspective, the
implications from standard adjustment cost models discussed above suggest we should ob-
serve an impact for continuers and entry and exit. Taken at face value, the results provide
support for the theory in terms of the entry and exit component but not for the continuer
component of job turnover. It may be that a richer model needs to be developed to account
for this nding { one interesting idea suggested by this result is that labor regulations dis-
tort the entry and exit margin to such an extent that job turnover patterns for continuers
are not impacted. That is, overall job turnover is stied via labor market regulations but
with a substitution towards adjustment of continuing rms relative to adjustment via entry
and exit.
While exploring the implications of this result are of interest both theoretically and
empirically, we note however that the analysis of variance as reported in Table 1 provides
insights on interpreting this empirical result. The analysis of variance results show that
variation in job ows across industrysize eects is dominated by variation in the entry and
exit component of job turnover. Thus, an important part of the variation that we are ex-
ploiting for identication and, in like fashion an important component of the variation that
can be distorted by regulations, is the variation across industrysize classes in entry and
exit rates. This interpretation suggests that the variation we are exploiting is best suited
for identifying an eect coming from entry/exit since that is where the variation is most
pronounced. To identify the impact on continuing businesses using this type of dierence-
in-dierence approach, it may be important to nd another dimension of variation across
rms with sucient variation across continuing rms.
Overall, these results conrm the importance of labor market regulations in shaping
labor adjustment patterns, particularly so in those industries and size classes where tech-
nological and market factors require more frequent employment changes. Controlling for
other regulations inuencing rm behavior does not signicantly alter the results. There is
also evidence in our data that labor market regulations are important mainly for entering
and exiting rms.
rms and the U.S. job reallocation for continuers as the propensity for reallocation for continuers. We have
also considered alternative specications where for both propensities we use the overall job reallocation
for the industrysize class and obtain very similar results. We also estimate the job ow regressions for
entering and exiting rms separately and nd that labor market regulations aect both entry and exit
margins.
264.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In the empirical analysis, we control for country and industrysize eects, as well as
for unobservable eects using a dierence-in-dierence approach. Moreover, we test the
robustness of results for hiring and ring regulations by including other regulatory variables.
In addition, we test the sensitivity of our results by using excess job reallocation instead
of gross job reallocation, restricting our analysis to industrysize cells with more than ve
rms in a given cell and to manufacturing industries only (not reported here but available
upon request). However, the use of quasi panel data may still run the risk that results
are aected by the inclusion of a specic country or industry in the sample that drives the
results in a given direction. The use of an unbalanced panel on the industry dimension
makes this risk potentially more serious.
Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Coecient on Enforcement Adjusted Hiring
and Firing Regulations Interacted with U.S. Job Reallocation and 95% Con-
dence Intervals, Excluding One Country or One Industry at a Time, Labor
Market Regulations (Column (1) from Table 4)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
To test for the robustness of results to changes in the sample, we re-estimate our
preferred specication - column (1) in Table 4 - removing one country, or one industry,
at a time from the sample. The results in Figure 3 show a remarkable stability of the
estimated coecient for the interaction term to changes in the sample along the country or
the industry dimension. The point coecient estimates for the interaction term are always
negative and statistically signicant. The coecient is somewhat sensitive to the exclusion
of Chile or Portugal, with both leading to a stronger estimated eect of regulations.
275 Conclusion
This paper exploits a rich new database with harmonized data on job ows across industries
and size classes for 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade. We nd
that all countries in our sample exhibit sizeable annual gross job ows. Industry and
size-class eects together account for a very large share of the overall variability in job
ows across country, industry and size class cells (e.g., over 50 percent of the variation
in the summary measure of job reallocation is accounted for by industry and size eects
interacted together). Interestingly, the most important factor here is employer size. Small
businesses exhibit a substantially higher pace of job creation and destruction and this
pattern is pervasive across industries and countries. Industry eects also play a signicant,
albeit much smaller, role in shaping job ows. Taken together, it is clear that some form of
technology, cost and demand factors that are common across countries account for the bulk
of the variation in job ows. Nevertheless, even after controlling for industry/technology
and size factors, there remain signicant dierences in job ows across countries that could
reect dierences in business environment conditions.
Our harmonized rm-level dataset allows us to look at two factors shaping the business
environment - regulations on the hiring and ring of workers and product market regula-
tions. To minimize the possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with
cross-country regressions, we use a dierence-in-dierence approach. The empirical results
suggest that stringent hiring and ring regulations (and their consistent enforcement) re-
duce job turnover, especially in industry and size-class cells that inherently exhibit more
job turnover. To capture the latter, we use the United States patterns as a benchmark to
identify and quantify industrysize class cells with inherently higher job turnover. Labor
regulations also appear to distort the patterns of ows across industry and size classes
within a country. Stringent labor regulations mainly aect the entry and exit of rms and
their associated job creation and destruction. Controlling for product market regulations
does not alter these results signicantly.
Much work remains to be done to understand the implications of our ndings. They
provide evidence that stringent labor regulations have an impact on reallocation dynamics.
It is a much larger step to demonstrate that stringent labor regulations have an adverse
impact on the ecient allocation of labor in a manner consistent with the predictions
of Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]. To explore the latter, we need to measure not only
reallocation but also productivity at the micro level. A number of studies have found
that allocative eciency is important for understanding dierences in the level and growth
of productivity across time, industries and countries (see, e.g., Foster et al. [2001] and
Bartelsman et al. [2007]). Putting those ndings together with those in this paper certainly
28suggests that stringent labor market regulations may have an important adverse impact
on allocative eciency and in turn productivity levels and growth. However, much work
(including additional data infrastructure development) is needed to bring all of the pieces
together to explore these important issues.
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32Table A.1: Data Sources Used for Firm Demographics and Job Flows
Max. industry coverage
Country Source Period (number of industries) Threshold
OECD
Finland Business register 1988-1998 All (17) Emp  1
Turnover:
France Fiscal database 1989-1997 All (17) Man: Euro 0.58m
Serv: Euro 0.17m
Germany (West) Social security 1977-1999 All but civil service, Emp  1
self employed (11)
Italy Social security 1986-1994 All (19) Emp  1
Portugal Employment-based 1983-1998 All but public Emp  1
register administration (19)
United Kingdom Business register 1980-1998 Manufacturing (10) Emp  1
United States Business register 1988-1997 Private businesses (19) Emp  1
LAC
Argentina Register, based on Integrated 1995-2002 All (19) Emp  1
System of Pensions
Brazil Census 1996-2001 Manufacturing (13) Emp  1
Chile Annual Industry 1979-1999 Manufacturing (13) Emp.  10
Survey (ENIA)
Colombia Annual Manufacturing 1982-1998 Manufacturing (13) Emp.  10
Survey (EAM)
Mexico Social security 1985-2001 All (17) Emp  1
TRANSITION
Estonia Business register 1995-2001 All (19) Emp  1
Hungary Fiscal register (APEH) 1992-2001 All (19) Emp  1
Latvia Business register 1996-2002 All (18) Emp  1
Slovenia Business register 1992-2001 All (19) Emp  1
3
3Table B.1: Average Job Flows in the 1990s, Overall and by Region, Total Economy (Un-
balanced Panel)
OVERALL
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Job Creation Rate 1048 0.147 0.067 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 1048 0.131 0.062 0.000 0.419
Net Employment Growth 1048 0.015 0.065 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.278 0.112 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.231 0.098 0.000 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 1048 0.055 0.043 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 1048 0.046 0.029 0.000 0.216
OECD
Job Creation Rate 448 0.127 0.046 0.033 0.288
Job Destruction Rate 448 0.127 0.060 0.029 0.411
Net Employment Growth 448 0.000 0.046 -0.282 0.148
Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.254 0.096 0.072 0.57
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.223 0.085 0.058 0.472
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 448 0.045 0.030 0.003 0.195
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 448 0.045 0.028 0.000 0.216
LAC
Job Creation Rate 300 0.148 0.061 0.033 0.431
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.140 0.066 0.041 0.419
Net Employment Growth 300 0.008 0.053 -0.214 0.286
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.288 0.114 0.086 0.785
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.248 0.103 0.066 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.056 0.040 0.000 0.227
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.053 0.032 0.003 0.152
TRANSITION
Job Creation Rate 300 0.174 0.088 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.128 0.061 0.000 0.385
Net Employment Growth 300 0.046 0.087 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.303 0.123 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.227 0.109 0.000 0.608
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.070 0.056 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.039 0.025 0.000 0.135
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database.
34Table C.1: Denitions of Institutional Variables
Variable Denition
Hiring and Firing Practices Flexibility in hiring and ring (5B(ii)) from Fraser Insti-
tute, hiring and ring practices of companies are deter-
mined by private contract (World Economic Forum: Global
Competitiveness Report); scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Business Regulations Regulation of business activities (5c) from Fraser Institute
(World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report);
scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Law and Order Integrity of Legal System (2e) from Fraser Institute, which
is based on Political Risk Component I (Law and Order)
from the International Country Risk Guide; scale [0,10], 10
being the worst.
Table C.2: Institutional Variables, 1990s
OVERALL
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.261 1.515 2.878 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 4.113 2.019 0.000 7.209
Business Regulations 3.490 1.389 1.100 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.490 1.233 0.000 4.600
Law and Order 2.280 2.818 0.000 10.000
EU & USA
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.427 1.804 2.878 7.400
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 5.084 1.559 2.878 6.600
Business Regulations 3.074 1.682 1.100 5.600
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.822 1.349 1.100 4.600
Law and Order 0.469 1.121 0.000 3.000
LAC
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.679 0.943 3.230 5.740
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 2.249 1.642 0.000 4.431
Business Regulations 4.206 1.297 2.617 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 1.811 1.321 0.000 3.320
Law and Order 4.949 2.769 2.280 10.000
TRANSITION
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 5.696 1.705 3.586 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.742 1.846 3.079 7.209
Business Regulations 3.323 0.669 2.650 4.200
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.757 0.716 1.776 3.486
Law and Order 1.763 1.119 0.637 3.300
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized rm-level database and Gwartney and
Lawson [2004].
35